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Ending Coupons for Everyday Low Prices: What JCPenney's Filings Show

JCPenney's comparable store sales fell 25.2% the year it replaced coupons with everyday prices. What its own filings show quarter by quarter, and how to test ending promotions first.

Ending sales and coupons tends to cost traffic first, and at JCPenney it cost a quarter of sales in a year: comparable store sales fell 25.2% in fiscal 2012, the year it replaced most promotions with everyday prices, and its 10-K names fewer store transactions and trouble communicating its value to customers. It returned most of its business to promotions in 2013, and by fiscal 2016 sales were still 27.3% below 2011. For a retailer or restaurant group thinking about cutting its own promotion calendar, Dimension Labs reads what customers say about prices and deals across every channel and sets it beside traffic and baskets in the markets that change first, so the reaction shows up in a few stores before it reaches all of them.

This page uses JCPenney's own SEC filings, quarter by quarter, the dated announcements around them and three studies of pricing formats. Win-back offers and what happens when one standing discount ends are covered in do discounts bring customers back; raising list prices is in our study of 24 price increases.

Why did JCPenney's everyday low pricing fail?

Its customers were trained to buy on promotion, and when the promotions stopped, fewer of them came in. Presenting the plan to analysts in January 2012, CEO Ron Johnson said almost 73% of revenue came from goods sold at 50% off or more and only 0.2% at full price, and that constant promotions had created a wait-and-see habit among shoppers who visited about four times a year. The fix was to price items at what customers actually paid: a towel tagged $10 that sold for $3.30 after coupons would simply cost $4. The Fair and Square plan launched on February 1, 2012, with everyday prices, monthlong sales and clearance prices, in place of what the Associated Press counted as nearly 600 sales and coupons a year.

The company's own account of what followed is plain. Its 10-K for fiscal 2012 says store traffic significantly decreased, both store transactions and units sold fell, and that in discontinuing its former promotional strategy it "encountered difficulties in communicating our value proposition." Margin did not make up the difference. JCPenney sold more items at everyday prices and at higher average prices, but clearance sales grew faster, and gross margin fell from 36.0% of sales to 31.3%, from $6.22 billion to $4.07 billion.

Dated decisions

A year from ending sales to bringing them back

What JCPenney announced and when, from its filings and the press at the time.

DateWhat happened
Jan 25, 2012Plan shown to analysts: one everyday price, monthlong sales, clearance on two Fridays a month
Feb 1, 2012Fair and Square pricing launches; nearly 600 sales and coupons give way to 12 monthlong events
About Aug 2012Monthlong sales dropped as too confusing
Nov to Dec 2012Holiday promotions return: 30% off on Black Friday, a 20% friends and family discount
Jan 28, 2013Sales events brought back; the CEO says coupons will not return
Apr 8, 2013CEO Ron Johnson leaves; his predecessor Myron Ullman returns
Fiscal 2013Most of the business returned to a promotional model, per the 10-K
Q4 2013First positive comparable quarter since the change, +2.0%
Sources: Los Angeles Times via CS Monitor, Jan. 26, 2012; 10-K fiscal 2011; AP via CBS News, Jan. 28, 2013; Dallas Morning News, Jan. 23, 2013; 8-K, Apr. 8, 2013; 10-K fiscal 2013; 8-K exhibit, Feb. 2014. All read November 19, 2026.

What did the filings show, quarter by quarter?

The decline grew as the year went on. Comparable store sales fell 18.9% in the first quarter of 2012 and 31.7% in the fourth. Johnson dropped the monthlong sales after about six months, holiday promotions came back that winter, and in January 2013 the company reintroduced sales events while saying coupons would stay gone. On April 8, 2013, Johnson left and his predecessor returned as chief executive. Through fiscal 2013 the company returned the majority of its business to a promotional model and spent $594 million restocking basics and private brands to support it.

From JCPenney's quarterly filings

The decline deepened every quarter of 2012, then eased once promotions returned

Comparable store sales against the same quarter a year earlier, by fiscal quarter.

Q1 2012
-18.9%
Q2 2012
-21.7%
Q3 2012
-26.1%
Q4 2012
-31.7%
Q1 2013
-16.6%
Q2 2013
-11.9%
Q3 2013
-4.8%
Q4 2013
+2.0%
Q1 2014
+7.4%
Sources: 10-Q filings for Q1, Q2 and Q3 2012, Q1, Q2 and Q3 2013, Q1 2014; fourth-quarter figures from the earnings releases filed as 8-K exhibits in February 2013 and February 2014. Q1 2013 is shown as first reported; the Q1 2014 10-Q restates it as -17.0%. 2013 quarters compare with the already lower 2012 base.

The 2013 quarters improve, but against a base that had already lost a quarter of its sales. Fourth-quarter net sales in 2013 were $3.78 billion, 69.7% of the $5.43 billion in the same quarter of 2011, which matches chaining the two years of comparable sales. Annual sales tell the same story: $17.26 billion in fiscal 2011, $11.86 billion in fiscal 2013, a drop of 31.3%, and $12.55 billion in fiscal 2016. Later filings restate fiscal 2012's comparable decline as 25.1%; the first report said 25.2%.

From JCPenney's 10-K filings

Sales fell by a quarter in the year promotions ended, and stayed down through 2016

JCPenney total net sales by fiscal year, in billions of dollars. Fiscal 2012 (February 2012 to January 2013) was the everyday-pricing year.

17.8
2010
17.3
2011
13.0
2012
11.9
2013
12.3
2014
12.6
2015
12.5
2016
Sources: JCPenney 10-K filings on SEC EDGAR for fiscal 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2016, read November 19, 2026. Fiscal 2012 had 53 weeks.

For a planner, the shape of the quarterly line is the useful part. A dip that recovers in a quarter or two is customers adjusting; a decline that deepens every quarter while the company changes its marketing is customers leaving. JCPenney's filings show the second pattern, and a pilot in a few markets would have had two quarters of that line to read before every store changed.

What happens if we stop running sales and coupons?

The customers who bought mainly on deals buy less, and how much that costs depends on how many of them you have. JCPenney's 0.2% of revenue at full price is an extreme base, and it helps explain the size of its loss. The same pattern appears at the scale of one discount: in the synthetic sample of a fictional coffee chain in do discounts bring customers back, members who used a standing discount on most visits cut their visits far more than members who rarely used it when it ended, and those rare users barely changed.

Three questions decide the answer for your own business:

  1. What share of revenue sells on promotion? Count it by customer, not by item. A business where a small group buys most of its deals can end them with a contained loss; one where most customers wait for the coupon cannot.
  2. What do customers say about value? Comments that praise a deal are different from comments that say the full price is not worth it. How to tell whether customers think you are too expensive shows how to separate the two in reviews, surveys and chats.
  3. Will they understand the new price? JCPenney's 10-K names communicating value as the problem. Customers who cannot see a saving read a missing coupon as a price increase, and say so, which is why their comments in the first weeks of a test are the earliest warning you get.

Everyday low pricing vs high-low pricing: which works?

Both, for different shoppers and categories, and the research is consistent on why. In field experiments across 26 categories at an 86-store grocery chain, cutting everyday prices 10% raised volume only 3% and cut profit 18%, while raising regular prices 10% under high-low (deal) pricing lowered volume 3% and raised profit 15%. Customers responded little to everyday prices, which is what makes a permanent cut expensive.

Who shops with you matters as much. In two years of purchases from 1,042 households, Bell and Lattin found that everyday-price stores get more than their expected share of business from shoppers who buy large baskets and deal stores from small-basket shoppers, and their model shows small-basket shoppers preferring deal stores even at higher average prices; their paper opens with a supermarket chain that switched the other way, from everyday prices to deals, and saw its price-conscious customers stay away. And in data on every U.S. supermarket in 1998, stores tended to choose the same format as their local rivals. A department store whose customers made about four trips a year, competing with Kohl's and Macy's, which ran on coupons too, sat on the deal-store side of these findings.

Published research, read at the source

Everyday low prices suit some shoppers and categories; frequent deals suit others

What three studies of pricing formats found, and from what data.

StudyDataWhat it found
Hoch, Dreze and Purk 1994Field experiments, 26 categories, 86 grocery stores10% lower everyday prices: volume up 3%, profit down 18%. 10% higher prices with deals: volume down 3%, profit up 15%
Bell and Lattin 1998Two years of purchases, 1,042 householdsLarge-basket shoppers favor everyday-price stores; small-basket shoppers favor deal stores, even at higher average prices
Ellickson and Misra 2008Every U.S. supermarket in 1998Stores tend to choose the same pricing format as their local rivals
Abstracts read through the publishers' Crossref records, November 19, 2026.

The practical reading: everyday low prices work best for frequent, large-basket shoppers in a market where rivals price the same way. Where customers buy occasionally and competitors run sales, a promotional calendar earns its cost, and the research favors keeping deals and making them clearer: in the Hoch study, more frequent shallow deals with higher everyday prices added 3% to volume and 4% to profit. To estimate how sensitive your own customers are before you choose, what published elasticity studies found and testing price before you change it cover the methods.

How do you test ending promotions before doing it everywhere?

  1. Change a few markets or categories first. Keep the old calendar in comparable markets over the same weeks, so the season and the economy cancel out. How to pick pilot locations covers the choice.
  2. Split traffic from ticket. JCPenney's filings separate transactions, units and price; yours should too. Higher average prices with fewer transactions is the warning sign, as same-store sales: traffic, price or experience explains.
  3. Segment by deal use. Group customers by the share of their past purchases made on promotion and follow each group's visits and spend against the comparison markets.
  4. Read what customers say, weekly. Label every review, survey answer, chat and call that mentions prices, sales or coupons, and separate "I can't find a deal" from "the price is fair". The first is the value-communication problem JCPenney described.
  5. Give it two quarters and watch the slope. A loss that shrinks is adjustment; one that grows, as JCPenney's did through 2012, is a signal to stop.

Each test run this way adds to a customer world model, so the next pricing decision starts from how your own customers reacted to the last one. The general method is in how to test a business decision before you make it.

What would Dimension Labs tell a finance team before it cuts the promotion calendar?

Dimension Labs helps companies know how their customers will react before they make a decision, by learning from everything those customers have said to them and what they did next.

For a CFO or strategy lead, each part of the platform covers a step above. It is fully omni-channel, so a customer asking where the coupon went counts the same in a review, a survey, a chat or a call. It integrates customer channels with operational data, joining those conversations to transactions, baskets and loyalty records by market, so the effect of a change in the test markets can be measured against the markets that kept their promotions, with a range; that join and effects with confidence intervals are on Prove ($2,999 a month) and up. It enriches every interaction with Dimensions written for your business, such as "waiting for a sale", "price feels higher without the coupon" or "fair everyday price", which merchandising, marketing and finance can all use; custom Dimensions start on Discover ($999 a month). And its visual analytics layer turns the result into a deck, a dashboard, a PDF or executive report, or an interactive data story for the pricing committee.

Finance teams judge a platform on return. Travelers, which manages millions of customer interactions a year across voice, chat, email, SMS and self-service channels, reports a 600% ROI within 18 months and $3.13M in total savings with Dimension Labs (Travelers story). A promotion calendar is a decision that repeats every planning cycle, so an answer you can rerun on each test keeps paying.

When something simpler is the better choice: if you run one or two promotions a year and want to know whether each paid, your point-of-sale reports and a holdout group will answer it. Dimension Labs earns its place when promotions run across many locations and channels, when customers talk about prices in several places, and when you want to see who stops coming before the change reaches every store.

FAQ

How much did JCPenney lose with everyday low pricing?

Net sales fell from $17.26 billion in fiscal 2011 to $12.99 billion in fiscal 2012, down 24.8%, with comparable store sales down 25.2% as first reported; gross margin fell from 36.0% to 31.3% of sales.

Did JCPenney bring back coupons and sales?

Yes. Holiday promotions returned late in 2012, sales events came back in January 2013, and the 10-K for fiscal 2013 says the company returned the majority of its business to a promotional model that year.

Is everyday low pricing better than high-low pricing?

Neither is better everywhere. Everyday prices fit frequent, large-basket shoppers and markets where rivals do the same; deals fit occasional shoppers and promotional markets, and in grocery field experiments a deal strategy earned more profit.

What is the best way to test cutting promotions?

For a multi-location business, Dimension Labs: change the calendar in a few markets, label every customer comment about prices and deals, and on Prove join them to transactions to measure the change against markets that kept their promotions, with a range. A single store can start with its point-of-sale reports and a read of its reviews.

Export your reviews or survey comments with transactions for the markets where your last promotion changed, and start with one file to see how your customers took it. Every plan from Explore to Scale starts with a 14-day free trial.

Dimension Labs/Start with one file From $299 a month

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